The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 43
Issue 3 September

Article 6

2016

Lessons from Sweden: Solidarity, the Welfare State, and Basic
Income
Almaz Zelleke
NYU Shanghai, az22@nyu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Social Work Commons

Recommended Citation
Zelleke, Almaz (2016) "Lessons from Sweden: Solidarity, the Welfare State, and Basic Income," The
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 43 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol43/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan
University School of Social Work. For more information,
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

Lessons from Sweden: Solidarity, the Welfare
State, and Basic Income
Almaz Zelleke
NYU Shanghai
Progressive critics of a universal basic income argue that most
nations face a budgetary choice between a full basic income and
investment in public goods, including universal health care, free
and well-funded education, and universal pensions, and have prioritized a robust welfare state, or the "Swedish Model," over basic
income. But examination of Swedish economic policy reveals that
the welfare state is only one of the ingredients of the Swedish Model,
and that another is an interventionist labor market policy unlikely
to be expandable to larger states without Sweden's cultural and demographic characteristics. Indeed, evidence suggests that Sweden's
own recent diversification—not only of race and ethnicity but of
occupational strata—will make the Swedish Model less stable in
its own home. What lessons can be applied to the case for a basic
income in the U.S. and other large and diverse nations or regions?
Key words: Sweden, basic income, welfare state, Swedish Model

Progressive critics of a basic income argue that governments should prioritize the public provision of goods and services over a basic income, pointing to the Swedish welfare state
in particular as a model for the U.S. to emulate. Late economist
Barbara Bergmann (2002, 2006, 2008, 2014) was a prominent
champion of the Swedish-style welfare state as an alternative
to basic income. Sociologist Lane Kenworthy (2014) makes a
similar argument in a book promoting the broader version
of the Swedish Model that includes some of its labor market
policies, in addition to extensive public provision of goods and
services. Nicolas Colin and Bruno Palier (2015) argue in favor
of a variant of the Swedish Model—Danish "flexicurity"—over
basic income and guaranteed jobs in the face of a future of
"lousy" jobs.
Bergmann, in particular, advocated a Swedish-style
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welfare state, with publicly provided universal health care and
childcare; high-quality, subsidized housing and college;
and high spending on public transportation and schooling.
Bergmann prioritized public provision over a generous basic
income for three interrelated reasons, which can be characterized as budgetary, paternalistic, and feminist objections to a
basic income. Bergmann argued that it would be impossible,
or at the least, highly unlikely, for the U.S. to finance a basic
income that would allow all to afford these goods on their own,
regardless of how many children or special medical needs they
had, and whether they were single parents or not (the budgetary objection). Even if the basic income were high enough, she
argued, some recipients would spend their money on other
things and not on what they ought to spend it on (the paternalistic objection). And if a basic income were high enough to
allow parents to support all their children, she feared that it
would encourage women to withdraw from the labor force,
and that would have negative effects for gender equality (the
feminist objection).
Kenworthy, while conceding that the idea of basic income
has some merit, argues that a generous basic income would
reduce employment and the tax base necessary to finance
government functions, including those public goods that only
government can provide—infrastructure, public safety, education, and a strong safety net—and which should take precedence over the freedom-maximizing potential of a basic
income. Colin and Palier argue that basic income seeks to
replace the entrepreneurial, wage-based economy, while a
generous in-kind welfare state complements it, by providing
the cushion that makes the inevitable intermittent unemployment of a dynamic, innovating economy tolerable to workers.
These authors and many others point to the likely substantial cost of a basic income and the significant political and economic difficulties involved in moving a large, liberal market
economy like the U.S.'s in the direction of a universal basic
income, but they underestimate the difficulties of moving the
U.S. in the direction of a Scandinavian welfare state. I have addressed several of these objections to a basic income elsewhere
(Zelleke, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2015) and will not repeat those
arguments. My aim in this essay is to examine the details of
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the Swedish Model beyond the usual shorthand of generous
public sector benefits and high taxes, to uncover other aspects
of the model that might suggest whether and how it could be
applied to larger and more diverse entities like the U.S. and the
European Union. In fact, the Swedish Model has not expanded
beyond its Nordic neighbors (with the possible exception of
the Netherlands) and has been in retreat in Sweden itself since
the 1980s. But the story of its development is a fascinating one,
and suggests why the more explicit redistributionism of a basic
income—exactly the thing that leads many skeptics to believe
it couldn't possibly succeed in the U.S.—might in fact be the
key that leads to a more durable and sustainable foundation
for egalitarian welfare states than the Swedish Model.

The Nordic Context
While I focus in this article on Sweden, the paradigmatic example of a comprehensive welfare state, Sweden shares
many characteristics with the other Scandinavian, or Nordic
states: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Iceland. The Nordic
nations are consensual democracies, in which political activity
aims to defuse conflict and achieve consensus (Hilson, 2008).
The goals of consensus and compromise are facilitated by historical, cultural, and socio-economic features of the Nordic
region, including their histories of constitutional monarchy
and parliamentary democracy (except for Finland), their lack
of serfdom, their late but swift industrialization, their small
size1, and their overwhelming religious homogeneity2. Their
geographic location between continental Europe and the
former Soviet Union (excluding Iceland) embodies their search
for a "third way" between capitalism and communism, and the
confluence of interests between workers and small farmers
facilitated the political compromises between these groups
and capitalists in the formation of their political economies in
the first half of the 20th century (Hilson, 2008). Thus, while
the Nordic states are now hailed as among the most egalitarian in the world, and credit for this fact is implicitly ascribed
to their welfare state institutions and policies, their histories
and culture reveal that their welfare states evolved from more
egalitarian, less socially fragmented starting points at the
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beginning of the 20th century than either their continental
neighbors to the south, including Germany and France, or the
U.K. and U.S. further away.

The Swedish Model
The Swedish Model is often characterized as a comprehensive welfare state with a strong commitment to full employment for all its members. While this is accurate, a closer
examination demonstrates that the Swedish Model involves
more than that, including political and economic policies that
are usually overlooked. There are four crucial elements to the
Swedish Model, but references to the Swedish Model tend
to emphasize only two of them: benefit programs, including
public provision of goods and services and cash benefits; and
the tax regime necessary to finance them. Equally important
not only to the success but to the very existence of the Swedish
Model are its system of market regulation, and the cultural
and demographic factors that provide the foundational material of its political and economic institutions and delimit the
policy options available to politicians and voters. A closer look
at all these factors suggests that if the Swedish welfare state is
the goal, a basic income may not only not be an obstacle, but a
necessary step to its achievement.
Cultural, Historical, and Demographic Factors
The cultural and religious homogeneity of Sweden during
the development if its welfare state, along with its small population, are well known, but it is instructive to explore these
demographic markers in detail. Sweden has fewer than 10
million people; in comparison, the U.S. has over 300 million
people, the U.K., France, Germany, Italy and Spain have
between 40 and 90 million, and the European Union as a
whole has 500 million. Religious affiliation rates are declining
everywhere, but the Lutheran Church of Sweden—until 2000
the state church—claims 70% of the population as members.
In contrast, Protestants of all denominations make up only
50% of the U.S. population; Germany has roughly the same
numbers of Catholics and Protestants, with each making
up about 30% of the population; and French Christians, the
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majority of whom are Catholic, make up only about half of the
population. More importantly, at the turn of the 20th century
when the foundations of the contemporary Swedish welfare
state were laid, Lutheran affiliation in Sweden would have
been almost universal.
The Church of Sweden was founded in the 16th century,
and the lack of competing denominations during the development of Swedish democracy had significant political and social
implications. The unchallenged supremacy of the Lutheran
church obviated the need for religiously-aligned political
parties, leading to a secularism in its political culture that distinguishes it from some of its larger European neighbors to the
south. It also led to a fusion of church and state priorities in line
with Lutheran egalitarianism, which is based on the idea of "a
priesthood of all believers," as opposed to a clerical hierarchy,
and which could not coexist with large and visible inequalities of wealth and power (Thorkildsen, 1997). In the context of
Lutheranism's emphasis on daily work and the maintenance of
order, unemployment is not only a social or economic problem
but, in the words of historians Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth,
"almost a sin" (Sørensen & Stråth, 1997, p. 13). In other words,
it is not only Sweden's homogeneity, but its particularly
Lutheran homogeneity, that formed the background to the
development of its solidaristic and egalitarian welfare state,
leading some analysts of Nordic social democracy to go so far
as to characterize it as "secularized Lutheranism" (Østergård
1997, p. 69; see also Sørensen & Stråth, 1997).
On the political front, Sweden enjoyed a relatively peaceful
transition from absolute monarchy to democracy, in contrast to
France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. Aristocratic privileges
in 19th century Sweden were focused on access to civil service
positions—positions in service to the nation—rather than on
large landholdings (Tsarouhas, 2008). Sweden's agricultural
sector was made up of a mix of large and small farmers, rather
than serfs and lords, and its freeholding peasants form the core
of the mythical Swedish folk—the idealization of the common
man in Swedish society that played a large part in the development of Swedish social democracy (Berman 2006; Sørensen
& Stråth, 1997; Tsarouhas, 2008). Peasants enjoyed representation in the Diet from the 15th century until estate-based
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representation was replaced in the 19th century by electoral
representation (Sørensen & Stråth, 1997; Kaufmann, 2013).
This history has two important legacies. First, the existence
of a large and politically recognized agricultural sector balanced the voice of labor in the industrial sector that developed
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, causing the government to develop benefit programs in a universal, rather than
strictly laborist fashion (Gustafsson, 2008). For example, as
pensions for the elderly were debated in the first decades of
the 20th century, the coalition between agrarian and proletariat parties led to the rejection of the Bismarckian worker-centric
pension model in favor of one that covered the entire population (Kaufmann, 2013)3. Second, the state's own reformist tendencies obviated the need for revolutionary struggle against
the state, fostering the country's consensualist political tradition (Trägård, 1997).
Political scientist Lars Trägård calls Sweden an "associative
democracy" because of its tradition of using local parish councils and stakeholder input to study and come to consensus on
social and economic matters (Trägård, 2007). For example, from
the late 19th century on, local labor exchanges were run jointly
by unions, employers, and local officials, and government commissions made up of different stakeholders continue to play
a large role in Swedish policy making (Rothstein & Trägård,
2007; Trägård, 2007). This characterization should not obscure
the political and economic unrest faced by Sweden in the late
19th and early 20th centuries. Despite (or because of) a strong
union movement linked with the birth of the Social Democratic
Party (the Sveriges Arbetarparti, or SAP) in 1889, Sweden suffered from significant labor unrest and became known as the
"strike capital" of the Western world (Berman, 1998, p. 43;
Micheletti, 1995, pp. 46-49). Nevertheless, its Lutheran orientation toward work, its generally benign state apparatus, and
its small scale—which facilitated the development in 1898 of
the federation of unions called the Landsorganisationen (LO),
followed four years later by the federation of employers, the
Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (SAF)—set Sweden on a particular path of compromise, moderation, and consensus that
dominated Swedish politics for three quarters of a century. In
Rothstein and Trägård's (2007) words,
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To speak in the language of contemporary historical
institutionalism, a series of relatively small and
contingent events, occurring at a very early point in
the process of modernization and democratization,
produced large consequences. The success of early
democratic neocorporatism set Sweden on a particular
path of institution making when it came to state-civil
society relations. Subsequent successes produced, in
Paul Pierson's language, "increasing returns," further
strengthening these institutional arrangements. (p. 249)
Market Regulation
The story of Sweden's high levels of unionization and the
political dominance of SAP are often told, suggesting that a
strong labor movement and a successful and sympathetic political party are the keys to the Swedish Model, but this narrative
omits the critical part played by Sweden's distinctive system of
market regulation in the development of the Swedish model.
Several milestones in the development of the Swedish system
of market regulation are worth recounting.
The existence of the labor and employers' federations,
along with a pragmatic, rather than ideologically rigid
workers' party in SAP—which would begin an unparalleled
40-year period in government in the 1930s—set the stage for
the broad-based coordination of economic policy that became
the defining feature of the Swedish Model in the first half of
the 20th century. LO's close relationship with SAP, along with
SAP's strategic decision to broaden its identity from a workers'
party to a people's party, strengthened the hand of the labor
movement in its negotiations with employers—to a point.
Nevertheless, the early years of the 20th century saw a high
level of labor strife. In the 1906 "December Compromise," LO
and SAF came to the first of a series of landmark agreements,
with LO recognizing employers' rights to run their companies
in exchange for the unions' rights to organize and bargain collectively (Tsarouhas, 2008, p. 43). This negotiation signaled a
disagreement between LO and SAF—over labor's part in the
management of firms—that was to re-emerge more than once
in the following decades.
Nineteen-thirties Sweden saw the highest level of labor
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unrest of any nation (Standing, 1988) and attempts by the
government to intervene. Instead, LO and SAF agreed to negotiate wages and work conditions independently of the government. Named for the town in which it was negotiated, the
Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938 began a period of bilateral negotiation between labor and capital that was to last until the
1970s. The agreement contained the seeds of the centralized
bargaining between unions and employers that was to come in
the 1950s (Högfeldt, 2005), but it also represented the failure of
LO's efforts, for a second time, to win German-style labor representation in firm management (Tsarouhas, 2008). Political
scientist Michele Micheletti (1995, p. 63) calls it the beginning
of the "labor market cold war" that lasted until détente collapsed in the 1970s.
The Saltsjöbaden Agreement was followed in 1944 by the
SAP-led government's expressed commitment to promoting
full employment, defined as frictional unemployment of only
2%. This was to be achieved by stimulating private investment,
socializing consumption, and an active labor market policy—
helping workers to transition from failing to rising industries
and firms (Standing, 1988). Then, in 1951, two LO economists
developed what came to be known as the Rehn-Meidner
model. The Rehn-Meidner model addressed the dilemma of
how to achieve full employment without creating unmanageable inflation, which neither labor nor capital wanted. The solution to this dilemma was a negotiated compression of the
wage scale, with equal pay for equal work set at a high level,
regardless of the profitability of the individual firm. This solidaristic wage policy moderated wage differentials and wage
increases, reducing financial incentives for workers to jump
from firm to firm in search of higher wages. Wage compression hastened structural adjustment by forcing unproductive
firms that could not afford the effective minimum wage out
of business. The model also endorsed the government's adoption of an active labor market policy to retrain and redeploy
workers from failing firms, and from regions with few jobs to
the cities where jobs were available.4 The Rehn-Meidner model
set the stage for the SAF's invitation to LO to begin centralized labor negotiations at the industry, rather than firm level,
in 1952.
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The Rehn-Meidner model sought to manage the labor
market in favor of high, stable wages for its members, while
sacrificing potentially larger gains for some workers in the interests of the stability of the entire system. Is such a strategy
the cause or the effect of social solidarity? It is likely to have
been both—possible because of the shared interests of mostly
male industrial workers in the "Golden Age" of strong, postwar growth, and reinforcing of their solidarity as long as it
was seen as contributing to continued growth. It is important
to note as well, however, that the Rehn-Meidner model once
again signaled labor's acquiescence, at least for the time being,
in a capitalist economy with a high concentration of private
ownership and management of capital (Tsarouhas, 2008).5
As will be discussed below, the unresolved tension underlying these agreements remained submerged only until the
1970s, when cultural, demographic, and economic changes
undermined the conditions that made them possible. But first,
it is instructive to compare the timeline of the development
of the benefit programs we think of as central to the Swedish
Model to that of the system of labor market regulation that is
sometimes left out of references to the model.
Development of the Swedish Welfare State
This remarkable set of agreements on labor market regulation between employers, labor, and the government coincided
with the development of the welfare state programs characteristic of the Swedish Model. In 1913, Sweden established the
first universal pension, comprised by a social insurance system
of pension benefits financed by contributions, to be phased-in
for current workers, and a system of need-based, means-tested pensions, which immediately covered all elderly poor, regardless of whether their employment was in the agricultural
or industrial sector (Hagen, 2013). This dual system evolved
into a universal, flat "people's pension" after WWII, in 1946,
with benefits no longer means-tested or linked to contribution
levels (Hagen, 2013, pp. 31-33; see also Kaufmann, 2013, pp.
128-129; and Tsarouhas, 2008, pp. 51-52).
The next phase of development was in the period around
WWII, and centered on policies to raise the birth rate, including marriage loans and maternity relief to help the poor finance
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family life, introduced in 1937 (Trägård, 1997), followed by
universal child benefits in 1948. Universal health insurance
was introduced in 1955, providing access to private health
care providers for all Swedes; in 1968, the medical system was
largely socialized, with health care providers becoming state
employees.
At the height of the Golden Age, with rising post-war wages
leading to concerns about the adequacy of the flat "people's
pension," a supplementary system of contributory pensions
was restored, securing a pension of 60% of average income
during the 15 highest earning years for those who had worked
for at least 30 years (Hagen, 2013, pp. 38-43). In 1965, the
"million homes" affordable housing program was established
to address the shortage of decent housing in Swedish cities and
to reduce the costs of labor mobility. Maternity benefits were
introduced in 1962, were later extended to fathers as well, and
were increased again in the 1970s, and state-subsidized childcare, first established in the 1960s, was greatly expanded in
the early 1970s. Together with the switch from joint to individual taxation of couples in 1971, Sweden's generous parental benefits—available only to those who are employed—has
given it one of the highest female labor participation rates in
the world, with an employment rate for working-age women
of 74% in 2015. (Only Iceland's and Switzerland's rates—82%
and 76% in 2015, respectively—are consistently higher than
Sweden's. In comparison, the 2015 rate for U.S. women was
63% [OECD, 2016a].)
Prior to WWII, unemployment benefits were financed and
administered by the unions, but state subsidies to the plans
began in the 1930s and grew rapidly after the war. In 1974,
employers were required to contribute, and in 1979 the system
was extended to all workers, financed by payroll taxes and
administered by the unions. The 1970s also saw the expansion of public sector employment in Sweden, which coincided with the entry of women into the employment sector
in large numbers; public sector employment accounted for
almost 40% of Swedish women's labor participation in 1970
(Flanagan,1987, p. 128), reached a high of about 60%, and
now, after a period of budget cuts, accounts for roughly 50%,
compared to 20% for men (Statistics Sweden, 2012, p. 59). As a
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result of its active labor market policies and large public sector,
Sweden has among the highest employment rates in the developed world, at 75% in 2015, compared to 69% in the U.S.
(OECD, 2016a).
To summarize, prior to WWII, the Swedish welfare state
included only need-based pensions and the beginnings of contributory pensions, and union-run unemployment insurance.
At that time, it was closer to a social insurance and residualist
social assistance model than to the more universalistic model
it developed into in the prosperous post-war period (Hilson,
2008). After the war, universal health care, pensions, and children's allowances were implemented, followed by active labor
market policies in the 1950s and 1960s to support the three-way
consensus by labor, capital, and the government to pursue full
(male) employment while moderating inflationary pressures
through a solidaristic wage policy. Public day care and parental leave policies, first implemented in the 1960s, expanded
in the early 1970s and, together with the shift in tax policy,
encouraged women to enter the work force in large numbers,
leading to Sweden's reputation as a highly gender-egalitarian
universalist welfare state.6 However, it was when the Swedish
welfare state shifted from a social insurance model based on a
male-breadwinner to a universalist model with a goal of male
and female full employment that the Swedish Model began its
decline.

Challenges to the Swedish Model
The 1970s brought a number of challenges to the Swedish
political economy. Some disruptions were felt by other advanced economies, including the oil shocks, women's increasing demands for equality and economic opportunity,
and the transition to a post-industrial economy. Some of the
most important challenges to the Swedish model were internal, however. LO—a male-dominated, blue-collar union
federation—reacted to the economic disruptions by shifting
from a strategy of labor market security, in which employment, but not particular jobs, is protected, to one of employment security, in which employees were protected from losing
the jobs they held. In the face of the decreasing importance
of manufacturing to the economy, LO abandoned its former
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commitment to equal pay for equal work in favor of a more
general commitment to equality of wages, a less tenable goal
in a post-industrial economy characterized by increasing automation, a growing public sector, and the rise of the knowledge worker. In addition, the government retreated from its
post-war policy of allowing structural adjustment to occur on
its own and adopted a more interventionist economic policy,
subsidizing failing firms in the hopes of having them emerge
from what were viewed as cyclical downturns (Hilson, 2008;
Standing, 1988).
Finally, both LO and their SAP allies abandoned their
agreement with employers to leave labor market regulation to
negotiations between unions and employers, legislating regulations to make employment more secure. Legislation enacted
in the 1970s created seniority protections and made it much
harder to dismiss employees, and mandated the board representation and input into work rules LO had long sought for
the unions, though management remained in control of firm
decisions (Högfeldt, 2005, pp. 545, 552). In 1976, LO sought
legislation to create "Wage Earner Funds" designed to capture
some of the profits earned by the most profitable firms, which
benefited from LO's imposition of wage restraint on their
workers. The plan was to transfer a portion of firm profits to
the collective ownership of firm employees up to a small majority—52%—of shares over time. The attempted legislation
of Wage Earner Funds was seen by SAF as a violation of the
agreement to negotiate independently of government, not to
mention of the underlying bargain around a form of regulated
capitalism, rather than socialism (Meidner, 1993; Standing,
1988, pp. 139-144). Furthermore, the plan failed to generate
widespread popular support since it was limited to industrial
workers in the most competitive firms (Tsarouhas, 2008).7 SAF
withdrew from centralized bargaining in 1983.
This breakdown in the system of labor market regulation
can be attributed to strategic missteps by LO and SAP, or to
secular changes in global economic conditions over which
the Swedes had little control, but they expose the underlying instability of the bargain made between labor, capital,
and government in the earlier decades of the 20th century.
As LO Economist Rufolf Meidner, one of the architects of the
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Rehn-Meidner model, notes, the solidaristic wage policy was
unable to meet the challenges of the post-industrial economy,
as LO failed to maintain consensus around wage differentials
for different kinds of work (Meidner, 1993).8 More importantly, the halo around the Swedish model obscures the opposition of employers during its development. Throughout the
20th century, Swedish employers resisted many of the moves
to make the welfare state universalistic, rather than status-specific. While employers were defeated in the post-war Golden
Age, when Sweden and the rest of Europe reaped the benefits
of peace and reconstruction in the form of robust economies,
LO and the SAP leadership of the 1970s (when Olof Palme was
prime minister) seem to have underestimated the opposition
by owners of capital to their ultimate goal of not only political and social democracy, but economic democracy as well
(Högfeldt, 2005).
According to economist Peter Högfeldt, SAP's longstanding bargain with Sweden's capitalists was predicated not only
on maintaining capitalist control of Swedish industry, but on
maintaining a particularly concentrated form of ownership that
brought stability and predictability to the Swedish economy.
Throughout the 20th century, SAP policies in banking and taxation reinforced capital concentration among a small group of
owners and a stable group of large, export-oriented "national
champions," as opposed to encouraging broad distribution of
capital and disruptive entrepreneurship (Högfeldt, 2005, p.
542). According to political scientist Michele Micheletti, the
period of cooperation between LO and SAF rested on their
agreement on shared means of full employment, low inflation, and economic restructuring in support of divergent
goals—of promoting high standards of living for workers, in
LO's case, and of promoting international competitiveness, for
SAF. When changing economic circumstances called for different means, their underlying differences came to the fore
(Micheletti, 1995).
Full employment remains a goal of Swedish economic
policy, and work incentives remain strong given the high tax
rates that reduce take-home pay, but protective employment
regulations make shirking and absenteeism a problem for employers. Full employment has proved elusive since the 1970s,
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and has given way to increasing labor market segmentation
between those with full-time work and part-time workers
who want more hours, and between those in protected jobs
and those in active labor market programs (Gustafsson, 2008).
Young adults, immigrants, and older workers are increasingly
relegated to training programs and involuntary early retirement, artificially lowering the official unemployment rate—
currently 8%—according to skeptics (OECD, 2016b). Active
labor market programs reflect the continuing commitment of
the government and society to the goal of full employment,
but they look increasingly like substitutes for jobs, rather than
transitions to them.
Full employment is critical to the Swedish Model for two
reasons. The high cost of the welfare state requires high taxes
to finance it—taxes that come predominantly from income
taxes, rather than other sources, like corporate or wealth taxes.
This tax structure requires a broad base of workers, particularly with the aging population Sweden shares with its European
neighbors. Second, the social solidarity underlying the universalism of the welfare state is inextricable from the full participation of Swedes in making the welfare state possible. A strong
norm of reciprocity is the foundation of the model, and it is
difficult to see how the universalistic welfare state—already
under retrenchment in the face of a less robust economy—survives without it. Sweden's welfare state has in the last 20 years
moved in the direction of stricter guidelines for eligibility
and lower income replacement rates—away, that is, from the
welfare state's "equality of the highest standards," in EspingAndersen's words (1990, p. 27), and toward more modest benefits and small steps toward privatization in schools, pension
funds, and healthcare—including school vouchers and partial
privatization of the government pension system, which even
Republican President George W. Bush failed to enact in the
U.S.
The Swedish Model in its heyday combined the goals of
full employment, economic growth, and social and economic
equality. The model was supported by cultural and historical
factors unique to Sweden and its Nordic neighbors, including
their small size, Lutheran homogeneity, and the trajectories of
their industrialization processes, but it was achieved through
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the ability and willingness of its major economic and political
groups to compromise and create a consensus for socialization
of income and consumption, concentration of private ownership of capital, regulation of markets, stability, and the sublimation of individual economic ambition for the greater good.
The Swedish Model has proven adaptable, with elements of
the bargain reassessed and revised as economic circumstances
warrant. It remains to be seen how much adaptation in the direction of a more liberal welfare regime the Swedish Model
can absorb while retaining its universalistic distinction.

Lessons from Sweden
I began this essay by suggesting that the Swedish Model
includes more than just generous and universalistic benefit
programs and the high taxes that pay for them. As described
above, the background conditions of the model that emerged
in 20th century Sweden include a small, homogeneously
Lutheran population; a largely independent and politically respected agricultural sector; a consensualist political tradition
built on a reformist, rather than revolutionary, evolution to democracy; a parliamentary form of government; consensualist
and coordinated economic policy; and high levels of unionization. For a political theorist, the emphasis on consensus in the
Swedish Model—whether on coordination of the labor market,
as Meidner (1993) describes, or on universalism in benefits
and labor force participation, as Pontussen (2011) describes—
evokes nothing so much as the social contract theory of French
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. As political scientist Lars
Trägård notes, Scandinavian political culture is democratic,
not liberal—marked by centralized power, uniformity, and an
inclusive, participatory democracy through which the "general
will" can be uncovered and implemented. The Swedish citizen
is, he argues, "perfectly independent of all his fellow citizens
and excessively dependent on the republic" (Trägård, 1997, p.
261.) Historian Henrik Stenius characterizes the Nordic form
of democracy similarly, not as a balancing of opposing interests, but as a quest to express the true interests of the people,
and founded on the belief that "a people is happy when it can
pass laws on its own and then make a commitment to obey
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them" (Stenius, 1997, p. 170).
This Rousseauian characterization of Nordic political
culture suggests the limits of its applicability as a model for
emulation elsewhere. As Stenius notes,
In Southern Europe the concept of citizenship meant
that each individual had the same relation to the
state despite the diversity in their ethnicity and social
standing. In the Nordic countries, individuals were
citizens because people were similar to each other
socially, ethnically, and religiously. (1997, p. 167)
Perhaps, then, it should come as no surprise that the Swedish
Model has not been widely emulated in Europe. In fact, since
the 1990s, while the country has attempted to maintain the
core commitments to full employment, active labor market
policies, and universal health care, pensions, and childcare,
the Swedish welfare state has moved more in the direction of
reducing benefits than Europe has moved toward embracing
the Swedish Model (Kaufmann, 2013).
Could the Swedish Model be adapted to a large and
diverse liberal state, like the U.S.? In other words, is it possible
to transplant some elements of the Swedish Model to a nation
with a different cultural and demographic profile? Certainly,
other European nations with larger and more diverse populations than the Nordic nations have managed to provide universal healthcare and education, child allowances, and good
public infrastructure to their citizens without Sweden's bilateral labor negotiations or solidaristic wage policy, but they
have done so in conjunction with other kinds of coordinated
labor and economic policy—a very inflexible labor market (in
the case of France) or firm-level co-determination (in the case
of Germany), for example. Few European nations have universal childcare, though, a crucial factor in Sweden's high female
labor force participation rate, both on the supply side (making
work possible for mothers) and the demand side (making jobs
available for women). In other words, while the level of social
provision in Europe may be generally higher than it is in the
U.S., the particular mix of benefits, labor policies, and market
regulations reflect cultural and national differences in priorities, strategies, and goals, and add up to different packages in
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each nation. Critical elements of the Swedish Model are not
only missing from the U.S. context but incompatible with its
liberal market economy and political separation of powers.
The U.S. lacks both a strong commitment to full-employment
and a consensus in favor of an expensive welfare state, it substitutes the "wage discipline" of unemployment for self-moderation in wage demands by the labor sector, and it lacks (and
in some cases legally prohibits) the consensual cooperation of
unified labor, capital, and political actors on wages rates and
industrial policy.
Since the publication of Thomas Piketty's Capitalism in the
Twenty-First Century (2014), it is hard to escape the sense that
all employment-based welfare states are as exceptional as the
Swedish welfare state. As his data suggests, their development
coincided with an extraordinary period in economic history
during which economic returns from capital were at historic
lows and economic returns to employment were at historic
highs. While the Swedish welfare state succeeded in socializing employment income through its full employment and solidaristic wage policies and socializing consumption through
its provision of public goods, it did little better than other
European states at durably socializing capital (Piketty, 2014,
pp. 344-347)9, and indeed seems deliberately to have chosen
not to socialize capital, much to the chagrin of the labor movement. If we are now in a period of declining returns to employment and increasing returns to capital, as Piketty suggests, the
Swedish Model, however attainable it might or might not be
by other nations or regions, may have outlived its usefulness
as a model for other nations to emulate.

Lessons for the U.S.
It goes without saying that the adoption of a Swedish-style
welfare state would herald a marked improvement in the lives
of millions of Americans who live in poverty, who face repeated and extended bouts of unemployment, who remain uninsured despite the passage of "Obamacare," and who struggle
to find and afford the childcare that would make holding on to
low-wage jobs easier. But given the cultural and demographic
foundations of the Swedish Model, is it plausible to expect the
adoption of that kind of welfare state in the U.S.? If so, given
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that we are in the realm of fairly utopian thinking anyway,
might we be more ambitious?
To the first question, it is clear that the U.S. has a very different cultural, historical, and political context than Sweden:
a population 30 times its size; racial, ethnic, and religious diversity far beyond that in Sweden; a federalist, presidential
political structure designed by our founders to foster competition, rather than a centralized, parliamentary government
designed to foster compromise; less trust in government and
collective action, and more faith in individual initiative and
achievement due to our revolutionary history and to waves of
immigration of groups persecuted and marginalized by their
former governments; and the pernicious legacy of slavery.
Slavery's legacy is multifaceted, and has not only marked
African-Americans for continuing violence, theft, disenfranchisement, and discrimination, but has contributed to the development of American political and economic institutions in
ways that make the expansion of the welfare state much more
difficult than in European nations. Not only did the institution of slavery create an early and enduring division between
the economies of the northern and southern states, it was only
dismantled through a brutal and devastating civil war, the
outcome of which, it is fair to say, has not been fully accepted
by the losing side. The argument that the kind of reciprocity
between labor and capital embodied in the Swedish Model is
a strong value in the U.S. can only be made in willful disregard of the continuing economic and political subjugation of
African-Americans (not to mention the immigrants from Latin
America who are the foundation of our agricultural sector) 150
years after the end of slavery.
Even setting aside the question of race in theory—impossible as it would be in practice—the forms of consensus
around economic issues that underlie the Swedish Model are,
quite simply, entirely absent in the U.S. Instead of a consensus around egalitarianism and a regulated market, our founding mythology centers on a natural aristocracy of merit, free
markets, and negative liberty, rather than a Rousseauian positive liberty. We never had anywhere near the degree of unionization in the U.S. that Sweden enjoys,10 nor do we have the
stable concentration of capital ownership that Sweden has,
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or the parliamentary political system that would foster the
creation and durability of a consensus around these important
issues.
When we examine the welfare state the U.S. was able to institutionalize in the 20th century, we can compare the nation's
success at providing universalistic benefits through public
provision and through cash. The benefits we provide in kind—
public primary and secondary schooling, and low-income
housing—were deliberately segregated by race at the outset,
and remain largely segregated today, despite the outlawing of
outright racial segregation, through economic and residential
segregation. In addition, the federal government's expansion
of Medicaid—federally-funded, but state-implemented health
care for low-income Americans—continues to be resisted by
19 states, including most of the states in the old slaveholding
south that continue to have large African-American populations. Welfare state institutions in the U.S. that are administered by the states are often administered in discriminatory
and unequal ways. Could we expect public provision of childcare to be any different?
If we look at cash benefits, it is true that in the case of Social
Security, our federally-implemented contributory old-age
pension, African-Americans were excluded from participation
through limitations on the employment covered by the Social
Security Act of 1935; at the time, African-Americans were disproportionately employed in agriculture and domestic employment, and those two industries were excluded as part
of the compromise with southern Senators necessary for the
act's passage. By 1954, however, the Act had been amended
to include those two industries—partly to expand the base
of contributors to pay for the pay-as-you-go benefits—with
the result that African-Americans are now included in Social
Security on exactly the same terms as white Americans. In the
words of political scientist Robert C. Lieberman, it was ironic
that "the exclusionary Old-Age Insurance program of 1935
became, by the 1960s, perhaps the closest thing to a race-blind
social program the United States has ever known" (Lieberman,
1998, p. 67).11
While we lose a sense of solidarity due to our large size,
our diverse population, and our federal and presidential
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political system, the example of Social Security shows that
when a universalistic, national cash transfer program is
enacted, it can overcome our legacy of racial discrimination
to generate an egalitarian program with political durability
unmatched, apparently, even by elements of the universalistic
Swedish welfare state. In a country with an enduring legacy
of state-level racism, federally-administered cash benefits are
likely to be distributed in a more egalitarian way than direct
public provision, which is always locally implemented. It
is more consistent with our liberal, individualistic political
culture—and would at the same time be more disruptive to
our enduring system of racial and economic segregation—to
provide lower income Americans (a disproportionate number
of whom are African-Americans and Latinos) with the means
to move to schools, cities, and industries through which they
can escape the ghettos to which their reliance on public housing
and locally-administered benefits confines them.
To move on to the second question, an advantage the U.S.
has over Sweden is that, like countries that skipped laying
copper phone lines and went straight to cell phones, the U.S.
can go straight to the problem of capital concentration without
going through the step of setting up a comprehensive employment-based welfare state. Piketty's data on increasing inequality in the U.S. and Europe since the 1970s makes a strong case
that economic inequality can only be durably reduced through
redistribution of income, wealth, and bequests, and not
through full-employment and the socialization of consumption alone (Piketty, 2014). True and enduring economic equality will require the redistribution of capital as well as income
and benefits in kind, either through the socialization of capital
through public ownership, or through a system of universal
dividends. A universal, unconditional, and individual basic
income is not the only way to provide citizens with economic security, but in the American context, with our particular
social, political, and economic history, it seems likelier than
the successful implementation of a comprehensive, solidaristic, and universalistic welfare state like Sweden's.
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Endnotes:
1. None of the Nordic states has a population larger than 10 million.
2. At least two-thirds of the population of each of the Nordic nations
is Lutheran, and Lutheranism remains the state church in Denmark,
Norway, and Iceland. Lutheranism was Sweden’s state religion
until 2000. Finland has two state churches, Lutheranism and Finnish
Orthodox Christianity, but the latter accounts for only 1% of the
population.
3. The pension system was initially designed to be financed by contributions, rather than taxes, but it evolved into a generous tax-financed, universal basic pension with an income-based supplement
in the interwar and post-WWII period (Kaufmann, 2013, pp. 129-31).
4. The Labor Market Board, the Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, or AMS,
was apparently nicknamed Alla Måste Söderut—“everyone must
go south”—reflecting its mandate of encouraging labor mobility to
achieve full employment (Hilson, 2008, p. 70).
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5. The Rehn-Meidner model included stimulation of public savings
and direct public investment, along with a liberal trade policy, in addition to the policies noted above (Hilson, 2008, chap. 2).
6. Women dominate (with over 80% of the positions) in the caring
professions, schooling, and secretarial work. Sweden’s high level
of occupational segregation along gender lines suggests a qualification of its reputation as a strongly gender egalitarian nation. See
Estévez-Abe (2006) for a discussion of occupational segregation in
Scandinavian countries with gender-egalitarian norms and high
female labor-force participation rates.
7. According to Standing (1988, pp. 139-44), a broader social dividend was considered and rejected during the period of discussion
about Wage Earner Funds, but I have found no other discussion of a
possible social dividend, or basic income, in my research.
8. TCO (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation), the professional employee’s union confederation, never participated in centralized bargaining at all, and the expansion of the public sector in the 1970s and
1980s increasingly made government, rather than LO and SAF, the
effective wage setter in the labor market as a whole.
9. Sweden, like Britain and France, saw a decline in the rate of inequality of wealth in the 60 years between 1910 and 1970, but it has
been rising in Britain and Sweden since the 1980s, and in France since
the 1990s.
10. Union membership in the U.S. peaked at 35% of non-agricultural
employees in the 1940s, and currently stands at about 11%. (Mayer,
2004). In contrast, Sweden had a level of union membership of almost
50% in 1907, and the rate peaked at over 80% in the 1990s (Tsarouhas,
2008, pp. 40-41; Hilson, 2008, table 5).
11. Social Security is also a progressive program, paying higher benefits to lower income recipients than to higher income recipients, in
relation to contributions paid over their work lives.
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